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A platform holds information on the demographics of its users and wants max-
imise total surplus. The data generates a probability over which of two products
a buyer prefers, with dierent data segmentations being more or less informa-
tive. The platform reveals segmentations of the data to two rms, one popular
and one niche, preferring to reveal no information than completely revealing the
consumer's type for certain. The platform can improve prots by revealing to
both rms a segmentation where the niche rm is relatively popular, but still
less popular than the other rm, potentially doing even better by revealing infor-
mation asymmetrically. The platform has an incentive to provide more granular
data in markets in which the niche rm is particularly unpopular or in which
broad demographic categories are not particularly revelatory of type, suggesting
that the prot associated with big data techniques diers depending on market
characteristics.
*Cambridge INET, Austin Robinson Building, Sidgwick Ave, Cambridge CB3 9DD,
gc556@cam.ac.uk
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KEYWORDS: Strategic interaction, network games, interventions, industrial organ-
isation, platforms, hypergraphs. JEL classication: D4, L1, L4.
1 Introduction
Large online platforms hold increasingly detailed information about their users, which
most commonly involves the collection of demographic data, such as age, location,
gender and race, and behavioural data, such as browser history, device type and browser
ngerprinting. The focus of the discussion on this form of so-called big data has been
on potential privacy concerns (see, e.g., Aquisti, 2014; Tao et al 2019; Cecere et al 2017
and Belleamme and Vergote, 2016) and third-degree price discrimination in the case
of monopolies (Shiller, 2014; Townley et al, 2017; Esteves and Cerqueira, 2017 and
Esteves and Resende, 2019), with the latter literature focusing on the fact that such
data is informative of consumer preferences.
However, a well-known result in the price discrimination literature (Thisse and
Vives, 1988, Bester and Petrakis, 1996, Chen, 1997, Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000, and
Armstrong, 2005) is that rms having information that allows them to price discrimi-
nate in a horizontally dierentiated market tends to reduce prots. As such, it is less
clear how platforms that host rms can use demographic and behavioural data to in-
crease aggregate prots directly, and why such data is (at least partially) shared with
rms on platforms like Airbnb and Amazon Marketplace.
We examine the case where there are two rms, one popular and one niche, on a
platform selling to a unit mass of buyers. Buyers are of two types, with a consumer
of type i preferring rm i. There are more consumers who prefer the popular rm
to the niche rm. The platform potentially has access to information on a range of
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buyer characteristics, which are informative of the preferences of consumers in the
sense that they generate a known posterior distribution of types that dier from the
prior type probability. The platform owner chooses which of these characteristics to
reveal to the rms, generating a segmentation of the dataset. We allow the platform
to reveal dierent segmentations of the data to each rm, with the aim of maximising
aggregate prot. We show an example of a case where the rms are each shown dierent
segmentations of the same dataset in Figure 1 below.1
Figure 1: A representation of the case where one rm is shown information on buyer
age, while the other is shown information on location. The black nodes represent rms
and grey nodes represent buyers.
The platform owner faces a trade-o: segmentations that accurately reveal rm type
increase the ability of rms to target rms of their own type, but reduce prices in
segments where there are relatively few buyers of that type. Consistent with the price-
discrimination literature cited above, fully revealing each buyers' type reduces prots
relative to providing no information at all. However, prots can be increased by display-
ing segments that are partially informative: specically, if there exists a segmentation
1As discussed in more detail below, throughout we will consider the platform owner's choice of
segmentations as choosing a hypergraph, with each edge containing a segment of buyers and a single
rm. To simplify the diagrammatic representation of the platform owner's problem further, we will
show edges containing a small amount of buyer nodes, which, given the assumption that there is a unit
mass of buyers, can be thought of as representing a number of buyers rather than a single buyer.
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in which there are some segments in which the niche rm is more popular than they
are on average, but still less popular than the other rm, then showing both rms such
a segmentation is prot increasing. In this case, the price rise in segments where the
niche rm is relatively more popular outweigh the fall in prices in segments where they
are less so.
Furthermore, the platform is potentially able to increase prots further by showing
the two rms dierent segmentations. Doing so can induce the niche rm to set a price
that is only attractive to their own types in segments where the niche rm is relatively
popular, which in turn increases the price both rms set in segments where the niche
rm is less popular. Overall, this potentially causes a rise in prices for all consumers,
increasing prots.
We also provide an account of the type of markets where big data is more likely
to be prot increasing for the platform. In markets where broad demographic data
is not a strong signal of preference, if the platform owner provides both rms with
the same segmentation, then she has an incentive to provide both rms with more
informative signals than in markets where broad signals are relatively informative of
consumer preference.
Furthermore, the more niche the less popular rm is, the more informative the
segmentation that the platform owner optimally provides: when a rm is particularly
unpopular, it would require a very informative segmentation to induce it to set a higher
price than the popular rm, and as such the platform can provide a more informative
signal without inducing too much competition. This provides a potential explanation
as to why niche products are becoming an increasingly large proportion of consumers'
total consumption bundle in the last decade or so (Neiman and Vavra, 2020).
Our approach introduces two methodological innovations. First, we separate demo-
4
graphic information from buyer preference by having the platform choose segmentations
according to the former in order to be informative about the latter. In contrast, ap-
proaches to similar problems (see Elliott, Koh and Galeotti, 2021 and Bounie, Dubus
and Waelbroeck 2021) involve the platform directly segmenting up buyers according to
their preferences directly. Our approach more closely captures the trade-os involved in
third degree price discrimination, where signals of preference are limited to the struc-
ture of the data held by the platform, and also make comparisons between markets
with dierent levels of polarisation and distibutions of buyer preference.
Secondly, we show that an informative way of representing the platform owner's
problem is that they are choosing between a set of hypergraphs that are consistent
with some underlying data set. The hypergraphs are bipartite, linking a rm with a
subset of buyers that share at least one characteristic, with rms choosing a dierent
price for each edge of the hypergraph.2,3
Along with the aforementioned work on price discrimination, our analysis ts into
a wider literature on information design, contributions to which include Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011) and Bergemann and Morris (2016). A strand of such literature has
explicitly examined how information design might be used by consumers (Ali et al,
2020), rms (Novshek and Sonnenschein, 1982; Vives, 1988, Raith, 1996; Johnson and
Myatt, 2006) and platforms (Roesler and Szentes, 2017; Charlson 2020 and Armstrong
and Zhou, 2020).
2A hypergraph is a generalisation of a graph in which the edges can be any non-empty subset of
the nodes, as opposed to being only a pair of nodes.
3Economic papers that utilise hypergraphs in one form or another include those that model com-
munication structures (Myerson, 1980; van den Nouweland et al., 1992; Slikker et al., 2000), those
that model attack and defence networks (Dziubinski and Goyal, 2017) and network formation models
(Chen, Elliott and Koh, 2020).
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2 Model
Suppose there are two rms, f1 and f2, and a unit mass of buyers who interact on
a platform. Firms oer a single, horizontally dierentiated good. The platform is
controlled by a platform owner, who provides information to the rms in order to
maximise joint rm prots.
Suppose that a buyer bi is associated with a set of base characteristics (e.g. age, race,
gender, location). Let Ω be the set of characteristics known to the platform owner and
a descriptor Di ⊂ Ω, refer to a collection of characteristics (such as black, woman),
with D denoting the set of all descriptors.
A segmentation, Si of the set Ω is the set product of B and a descriptor Di with
cardinality y. A feasible segmentation can be denoted S = {s1, ..., sy} where: i) si =
{b ∈ B|Di ∈ D}; ii) {si ∩ sj} = ∅ for all si, sj ∈ S and; iii) {s1 ∪ s2 ∪ ....sy} =
B. A segmentation partitions all buyers into a collection of segments of buyers that
collectively contains every buyer and such that each segment contains a disjoint set of
buyers that share a characteristic or set of characteristics, D.
Each buyer demands a single unit of a good inelastically, and there are no outside
options. Let type space, υ = {1, 2}, be such that there are two types of buyer. Con-
ditional on being of type i, a buyer, bi, has a random valuation of yi ∼ U [12 , 1] for rm
fi's product and a valuation of 1 − yi for fj's product, where yi is iid across buyers.4
We dene Vi as the set of type i buyers and let ρi= |Vi|n , the prior probability that a
buyer is of type i. We assume throughout that f1 is the popular rm with ρ1 >
1
2
that the other rm, f2, is niche.
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4This abstraction allows us to easily characterise the distribution of preferences of any arbitrary
subset of buyers. The same principles of segmentation using data outlined here would still hold (and
be more potent) if the platform owner had more precise information regarding the strength of buyer
preference as well as its direction.
5The case where both rms are equally popular reduces to a Hotelling setting. In that case,
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A segmentation, Si, then, along with the prior probability ρ1 and the type space υ
generates a probability space (Si,υ, ρ1). The platform presents rm fi with a segmen-
tation, Si, of the data, for i = 1, 2, and thus its strategy is such that it chooses a set of
two segmentations, {S1,S2}. A segmentation induces a posterior conditional probabil-
ity distribution on (Si,υ, ρ1), α(υ|si),where α(υ = 1|si) is the conditional probability
that a buyer from the segment si is of type 1. We dene a market,M = D × υ, as a
distribution of buyers over type and description space.
The set of segmentations chosen and the subsequent posterior joint probability dis-
tributions generated is assumed to be common knowledge: fi knows the distribution
of types in across the segments within Si and Sj but they do not know the precise
valuation of their product by any one buyer, regardless of the segmentation chosen by
the platform. Conditional on a set of segmentations {S1,S2}, let π1k(p1k,p2;S1,S2) be
f1's expected prot from a segment k as a function of p1k and the vector of 2's prices,




[α(υ = 1|si, sj)(1−χ(p1i− p2j))pik +α(υ = 2|si, sj)χ(p2j − p1i)p1i]
where χ(p1i − p2j) = p1i − p2j i p1i − p2j > 0, and 0 otherwise. Hence the rm's
maximisation problem for the segment si can be stated: maxp1i{p1ix1i(p1i,p1)} =
maxp1i{π1i(p1i,p2)}.The equilibrium of the pricing game is a a set of price vectors,
(p1, p2), one for each rm, such that the price, pik, for a segment, sk, is a best-
response to the equilibrium price vector, pj, where j 6= i. We assume throughout that
the platform owner would require information regarding the strength of buyer preference in order to
increase prots using segmentation, but the principles of doing so would be very similar to those we
outline here.
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the platform owner maximises joint expected prots, πP (p1, p2), choosing a set of seg-
mentations, S1,S2 to do so.
Let pik(pj) denote fi's reaction function, which is derive by nding the rst order
condition of the above maximisation problem. Then an equilibrium of the pricing game
is such that p∗ik(p
∗
j) is a best reply to p
∗
j for all i, j, k. Given the functional form of the
demand curves here, here is a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, (p∗1, p
∗
2) for any
pair of segmentations, (S1,S2).
3 The structure of information and hypergraphs
Hypergraphs
For a given market, M, a pair of segmentations (S1,S2) generates a bipartite hyper-
graph, H = (B; f1, f2;E) where each Ek ∈ E is such that Ek = {fi ∪ sk} for one rm,
fi. We dene a hypergraph as feasible if it can be generated by a feasible set of seg-
mentations as dened above, and let Λ be the set of all feasible hypergraphs. Finally,
let α(υ|sk) = α(υ|Ek) denote the conditional probability distribution generated by an
edge, Ek = {fi ∪ sk}.
As an example, suppose the segmentation is such that f1 is shown all British people
and non-British people separately, while f2 is shown under-40s and over-40s separately.
Such a situation can be represented in a hypergraph as depicted in Figure 1 above.
A rm, fi's pricing problem can then be represented as fi choosing a price pik for
an edge, Ek, such that fi ∈ Ek. The platform owner's problem can then be restated
as choosing a hypergraph H ∈ Λ which maximises joint prots. Throughout, we will
consider the platform owner's problem in this way. As Figure 1 shows, considering
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the platform's problem in this way leads to an intuitive representation of dierent
segmentation outcomes.
The information structure
We use the hypergraph representation described above to dene way of comparing
dierent segmentations of the data. We rst dene the union of two hypergraphs, H1
and H2 such that H1 ∪ H2 = {B; f1, f2;E1 ∪ E2} and Hi = {B̂; f1, f2; {Êi}i} as a
subhypergraph of H = {B; f1, f2; {Ei}i} if B̂ ⊆ B and Êi ⊆ {Ei ∩ B̂i} for all Êi: a
subhypergraph of H is thus created from H by the deletion of vertices that are elements
of H.
We then dene H
′
as a feasible renement of H if H
′
is feasible and H
′
can be
generated by taking the union of some subhypergraphs of H, i.e. H
′
= {∪Hi∈ΥHi},
where Υ denotes a set of subhypergraphs of H. We show an example of a renement
of a hypergraph below:
Figure 2: The original hypergraphH is composed of three subhypergraphs in the middle
picture, the union of which is a renement of H, H
′
.
The concept of a renement is a natural way of ordering the information structures
generated by demographic data. The hypergraph generated by showing both rms,
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for example, data on the gender and race of every buyer would be a renement on
the hypergraph generated by showing them data on just gender or just race. Every
feasible hypergraph generated by the platform is a renement on the no-information
hypergraph, Hn, in which there are two edges: E1 = {f1 ∪ B} and E2 = {f2 ∪ B}.
Similarly, the complete-information hypergraph, Hc, with edges, E = {fi ∪ bj} for each
rm-buyer pair fi, bj, is a renement of any feasible hypergraph.
Let yi denote the number of segments in the segmentation Si. Let P (Si) denote
the information structure generated by Si such that P (Si) is a 2 × yi right-stochastic
matrix whose generic element is βjk(Si) = Pr(b ∈ Ej|b ∈ Vk,Si). Let R be a garbling
(Markov) matrix whose rows are probability vectors. We state the following denition,
following Blackwell (1953):
Denition. S ′i is more informative than Si i RTP (S
′
i) = P (Si).
Following this denition, we state that H
′
is more informative than H i the segmen-
tations that generate H
′
,S ′1 and S
′




2 are more informative than
S1 and S2 respectively, where the latter two segmentations generate H. We state the
following result that reects the informativeness of a renement of a hypergraph, H
′
,
compared with H itself:
Proposition 1. For a given market, if H
′






to be a renement of H, it must be that D
′
P (S ′i) = P (Si) for i = 1, 2,
where D
′
is a matrix lled only with 1s and 0s and whose ith row and jth column
components are such that
∑
i dij = 1. This follows as for any edge, Ek, of the original











βjk(Si). The matrix D then satises the criteria for it to be a garbling matrix, which
immediately implies the Proposition.
A renement of H by denition provides more granular demographic data than H.
Intuitively, that renement is at least as informative as H, because at the very least the
rm can ascertain the distribution of types in an original segment of consumers in H
from the subset of segments that it is split into in H
′
. Our denition of informativeness
is thus a useful way of comparing dierent segmentations shown to rms by the platform
owner in the context being considered.
4 The costs and benets of informativeness
We characterise how the selective provision of information on consumer type may in-
crease prots from the benchmark of the no-information hypergraph. To do so, we rst
identify a necessary condition for a segmentation to improve upon the no-information
hypergraph. For this to be the case, it must be that the platform is able to induce at
least one of the rms to target more of their own types than in the no-information case.
Dene S as informative i it is more informative than Sn. Then the following result
holds:
Proposition 2. If Hn /∈ Λ∗, then ∃S which is informative.
If S is not informative, then α(v|Ek) for all Ek ∈ H. In this case, the equilibrium
price vector associated with H, (p∗1, p
∗
2), is such that f
′
is price for any edge Ek ∈ H




2) = πP (p1n, p2n), where pin is the price fi sets in response
to Hn.
For the platform to be able to improve its prot from the no-information case, it must
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be that a buyer's type is not independent of a feasible descriptor, or, in other words,
the conditional probability distribution α(υ|Ek) is not equal to the prior distribution of
types, α(υ). If not, it must be true that any segmentation produces a hypergraph that
yields the same prices and prots as the no-information hypergraph. For third-degree
price discrimination to be protable (or indeed, possible), demographic information
must be more informative of the type distribution of at least some buyers compared
with providing no demographic information.
However, the condition in Proposition 1 is a necessary but not sucient condition for
third-degree price discrimination to be protable. Providing a more precise signal to a
rm fi of each buyer's type increases the extent to which fi competes for buyers of type
j, which decreases prices for both rms. Hence, the platform owner faces a trade-o
between using demographic data to reveal information and competition concerns.
To illustrate a case in which information revelation can be harmful to prots, we
compare the no-information hypergraph to the complete information hypergraph, which
is totally informative of each buyer's type, trivially satisfying the condition in Proposi-
tion 1. Letting  represent the preferences of the platform owner, the following result
holds:
Proposition 3. Suppose ρ2 6= 0. Then, Hn  Hc.
The result of Proposition 3 is consistent with the ndings in Thisse and Vives (1988)
and Bester and Petrakis (1996), whereby providing rm in a Hotelling setting with
information on whether buyers prefer them or their competitor results in lower prices
and prots. While information on buyer preference allows for price discrimination,
the increased incentive for rms to compete hard for buyers of the other rm's type
outweighs the prot increasing eect of dierential pricing, reducing prots.
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Prot increasing segmentations
Dene a segmentation where α(v = 1|sk) > α(v = 2|sk) for all sk ∈ S as being
dominance-preserving and let HS refer to a symmetrically informative hypergraph
where both rms are shown the same segmentation, S. We can characterise a condition
that allows comparison between a subset of the segmentations potentially available to
the platform owner:
Theorem 1. If S and S ′ are both dominance-preserving and S is more informative
than S ′, then HS  HS′ .
If a segmentation, S, is more informative than another, S ′ , then the posterior distribu-
tion of types generated by S is a mean-preserving spread of the distribution generated
by S ′ (Blackwell, 1953). Conditional on fi being more popular than fj in every segment
of a segmentation shown to both rms, the platform owner's prot function is convex in
α(v = j|sk) for every sk ∈ S. This implies that the platform can generate more prots
by showing both rms the segmentation S than by showing both of them S ′ .
If S is an informative, dominance-preserving segmentation, then by denition it
generates a posterior distribution α(v|s) which is a mean-preserving spread of the type
distribution α(v). As the hypergraph Hn is symmetrically informative, Theorem 1
immediately implies the following statement:
Corollary 1. If there exists an informative dominance-preserving segmentation then
there exists a H such that H  Hn.
If there exists an informative dominance-preserving segmentation, then showing both
rms that segmentation is preferred by the platform owner to providing them with no
information at all. Note that Corollary 1 is a sucient but not a necessary condition
13
for it to be protable for the platform owner to segment the market in this way. Seg-
mentations that render the niche rm more popular in some segments can be prot
increasing if they are suciently small so as not to reduce prices in other segments
to too greater extent. Either way, the platform owner increasing its prots from the
no-information case is possible if there exists a segmentation that is, in some sense, not
too informative of consumer type. We provide an example that illustrates the result in
Corollary 1 below.
Example 1
Assume that ρ1 = 0.8 and buyers are either urban-dwellers or rural-dwellers according
to the only data the platform owner holds. The marginal distribution of types is below:
Type 1 Type 2 Total
Urban 0.3 0.2 0.5
Rural 0.5 0 0.5
Let su denote a segment containing every urban-dweller and sr denote a segment con-
taining every rural-dweller, such that sr ∪ su = B. Consider a 4-edge hypergraph, H,
where E1 = {f1 ∪ sr}, E2 = {f1 ∪ su} with E3 and E4 dened analogously for f2.
The equilibrium price prole generated by H is such that p∗24 ≈ 79 > 0.5 = p2n: rm
2 is induced to set a higher price than they do in Hn to these rms. This induces rm












. These prices imply that aggregate






5 The optimal information structure
The preceding analysis indicates that full information relevation is always suboptimal
for the platform, but under quite general conditions they are able to improve their
payo by revealing some information to the rms. The proof of Theorem 1 relied on
the platform owner showing each rm the same segmentation. However, as we have
seen, our framework allows for rms to be shown dierent segmentations to one another.
In this section, we will explore more general information structures in order to analyse
the platform owner's optimal segmentation choice.
A principle of least information revelation
We have shown that information revelation imposes a cost on the platform owner in
the form of increased competition, while potentially increasing prots by inducing rms
to set higher prices to groups of consumers who are relatively more likely to have a
preference for their product. We identify cases in which further information revelation
will not be benecial to the platform owner in any circumstance.
Information revelation increases competition by inducing a rm to decrease their
prices to a set of buyers who are less likely to be of their type. If this is not oset by
price increases for other groups of consumers, overall prot must fall. It follows that
providing more information to a rm that is setting a price that only attracts buyers
of its own type, without providing more information to the other rm will decrease
aggregate prots.
We formalise this intuition as follows. We dene an edge, Ek ∈ H, as being targeted
by a rm fi if the probability that any buyer, b ∈ Ek, of type j 6= i buys from fi is zero
in equilibrium for the set of information segmentations summarised by the hypergraph,
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H. The following result holds:
Proposition 4. Suppose that Es is targeted by fi and that for every b ∈ Es, b, fj ∈ Et.
If H
′
is a renement of H created by taking the union of two or more subhypergraphs
of Es, with every other edge the same as in H, then H  H
′
.
Proposition 4 establishes the principle that, conditional on buyers tting a particular
description are being targeted by a rm, and are observing a single price from the other
rm, the platform has an incentive to give the rst rm as little information on those
buyers as possible. By providing more detailed information, the platform owner risks
inducing the rm to set a price that attracts buyers of both types, which is unprotable
overall. By inducing a rm to set a price which only attracts buyers of its own type
within a segment, the platform induces the rm to essentially ignore buyers of the other
type. This increases prices throughout the market, and ensures more buyers purchase
the product that yields them the highest gross surplus.
To give an example of the implications of this result, suppose that fj is given infor-
mation such that buyers are split between two edges based on whether they are women
or men and that fi is given information on buyer's gender and race. If, in equilibrium,
fi's price is such that no type j black women buy from them, then providing more
information about those buyers (such as online behaviour or geographical data) would
be suboptimal.
Asymmetric data revelation
Proposition 4 also implies that if fi is targeting every buyer within a set of segments
shown to the other rm (and therefore fi's price is higher than any price set by fj
to buyers in these edges), then it is optimal (all else equal) for fi to be shown the
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same segmentation as fj. Doing so increases prices in edges where there is a more even
distribution of types, more than it decreases prices in edges where fi is more popular. ,
However, asymmetric segmentations can induce a rm that is less popular in a
particular segment of buyers to set a price where only buyers of their own type buy
from them. This outcome is possible because the rm, fi, who is more popular in that
segment can be induced to set a lower price than they otherwise would as they have to
compete with fj in another segment where there are even more type is.
The availability of asymmetric segmentations then present another trade-o for the
platform owner. When rms are provided with symmetric segmentations, rms set
higher prices in segments where types are more evenly distributed, which increases
prots conditional on the segmentations not being too informative. With asymmetric
segmentations, some of the benets associated with more even type distributions are
lost, because they generally involve one of the rms setting a single price in response
to two or more prices set by the other rm. At the same time, such segmentations can
induce the rm with more precise information to set a price such that only their own
types buy from them, which in turn increases the price of the other rm, including in
segments where type distribution is more unequal. This can increase prots for the
platform owner, as Theorem 2 makes clear:
Theorem 2. For any ρ1 ∈ (12 , 1), there exists a dominance-preserving segmentation,
S, such that (Sn,S) generates a hypergraph, H  HS .
Even if S and S ′ are dominance-preserving, it is still possible to induce f2 to set a price
seen by buyers in some edge E ∈ H which only attracts type 2s. An asymmetrically
informative hypergraph enables this as f1 can be induced to set a lower price to some
edge containing a relatively large number of type 2s than they would set inHS . This can
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induce f2 to set a price higher than f1 to these buyers, which can potentially increase
prots.
To see how asymmetric information can lead to an increase aggregate prot, suppose
f1 is totally uninformed. Inducing f2 to set a price in some edge, Ek = sk ∪ f2, higher
than they would in the equivalent edge in HS (at least) reduces the losses associated
with not revealing this segmentation by inducing f1 to set a relatively high price to other
segmentations. In fact, as f1 is in the position of setting a lower price in E
′
k = sk ∪ f1,
but by denition there are more type 1s than type 2s in E
′
k, it is possible to induce f1
to set a price which is greater than the price set by f2 in Ek ∈ HS . This implies in turn
that f2 sets a higher price in Ek ∈ H than f1 sets in E
′
k ∈ HS . In which case, every
buyer in H observes a pair of prices that are both higher than the prices that the buyer
observes in HS . It follows that the platform's prot increases.
Theorem 2 then implies that the ability for the platform to provide rms with
asymmetric data can be prot increasing relative to the case where they are restricted
to symmetric data revelation: they are able to induce the niche rm to set a price that is
higher than it would be for any symmetric cut of the data, which in turn can lead to an
increase in prots overall. Further increases in prot can result in more complex cases
such as when f1 is induced to set a price higher than f2's to a subset of the consumers
that f2 targets when f1 is shown no information. We provide an example of this below.
Example 2
Suppose that the platform has data on the age of buyers. Assume that ρ1 = 0.8, and
that the buyer type marginal distributions can be represented by the following table:
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Type 1 Type 2 Total
Under-25 0.12 0.04 0.16
25-30 0 00.4 0.04
30+ 0.68 0.12 0.8
First, we compare the hypergraph, HS where both rms are shown a segmentation, S,
which places all thirty and under buyers into one segment (s1) and all over thirty buyers
into another (s2), with H, where f1 is uninformed and f2 is shown the segmentation S.
Let E1 = {s1 ∪ f1}, E2 = {s1 ∪ f2}, E3 = {s2 ∪ f1}, E4 = {s2 ∪ f2} and EB =
{B ∪ f1}. Let p∗i and p
′
i refer to fi's price vector for HS and H respectively. Then
p
′








22 ≈ 0.48 > 0.45 ≈ p∗22. It follows that
every buyer observes a set of prices in H strictly larger than the prices they observe in
HS , and hence H  HS .
In fact, a further improvement can be made by showing a segmentation, S ′ to f1,
with S ′ splitting all under-25s into one segment and every other buyer into another.
Let H
′
represent the hypergraph generated by the segmentations (S ′ ,S). S ′ increases
the price f1 sets to the under 18s relative to the price it sets when it receives no
information. While the price f1 charges every other buyer decreases, the net eect is
to increase prots, and so H
′  H. We depict this example in the gure below.
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Figure 3: Blue and grey nodes represent type 1s and 2s respectively. Left hand panel:
The platform can increase prots relative to symmetric segmentations by giving f1 (on
the right) no information, while providing f2 with information on buyer age. Right
hand panel: the platform can increase prots even more by providing f1with a cut of
the data which is informative, but dierent to the one shown to f2.
6 Big data in dierent markets
Given the analysis in the previous sections, it is clear that the platform's incentive to
reveal information varies depending on the distribution of buyer types across charac-
teristics. We formalise this intuition by examining how market characteristics eect of
the extent to which data is relevatory to that rm's type and the overall popularity of
each rm's products.
Polarisation
Consider two markets,MA andMB, each populated with two rms, but with poten-
tially dierent distributions of buyers. We state the following denition:
Denition. Suppose that for two markets, MA and MB: (1) ρAi = ρBi for i = 1, 2
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and; (2) for any set of feasible segmentations, (S1,S2), if α(v = i|sk,MA) ≥ (≤)ρi,
then α(v = i|sk,MB) ≥ (≤)ρi and α(v = i|sk,MA) ≥ (≤)α(v = i|sk,MB) for i = 1, 2.
ThenMA is more polarised thanMB.
When a market is more polarised, demographic data is more revealing of buyer type
for any possible segmentation of the data set. For example, the demand for clothing is
likely to be dependent on even relatively crude demographic data, like gender or race,
whereas other markets, e.g. the market for white goods could be thought of as being
rather less driven by such relatively broad categories. Note that in the latter type of
markets, it would still generally be possible to accurately reveal consumer types to the
rms; for example, by disclosing information on customer online behaviour a platform
may be able to signal to rms which consumers are likely to value their products highly
in a way they cannot using traditional demographic data. The following result holds:
Theorem 3. Suppose that marketMA is more polarised thanMB and that HA ∈ ΛA
and HB ∈ ΛB. If HA and HB are symmetrically informative and dominance-preserving
then HA is not more informative than HB under the type distribution inMB.
When a market is less polarised than another, the platform owner has an incentive
to provide rms with a segmentation that would be, in the more polarised market,
more informative than the actual segmentation shown to rms in that market, if the
segmentation is dominance-preserving in the original market. This follows because,
as in Theorem 1, if SA is a mean-preserving spread of S and is dominance-preserving
then it generates higher aggregate prots than S. This relationship necessarily holds
in marketMB, which implies the result - showing both rms a segmentation at least
as informative as SA is optimal, and hence showing both rms a segmentation which is
too informative inMA may be optimal inMB.
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Theorem 3 suggests platforms have a greater incentive to invest in the collection
of detailed behavioural and demographic data in markets that are less polarised when
they are restricted to symmetric data revelation. In such markets, more general demo-
graphic insights are less likely to allow rms to accurately identify buyers who value
their product highly, and thus are unable to set higher prices to prot from such buy-
ers. Furthermore, the cost of revealing such data is reduced in less polarised markets,
because the niche rm is more popular in segments in which they are relatively un-
popular in the less polarised when compared with the more polarised. This softens the
competition eect associated with releasing more granular data.
In the more general case where the platform provides rms with dierent segmenta-
tions, a less polarised market does not always result in both rms being provided with
more information. For example, it might be that there is a segmentation that is too
informative in the more polarised market which, in the less informative market, induces
the niche rm to target their own rms when the popular rm is uninformed. This may
be prot increasing relative to some symmetrically informative hypergraph. In this
case, the niche rm is observing a more informative segmentation, but the popular rm
is less informed. We illustrate this point in Example 3.
Nevertheless, Theorem 3 implies that as markets become less polarised, more de-
tailed data on consumers will be useful to the platform owner, as such data is less likely
to be too informative in such markets when compared with more polarised ones.
Example 3
Suppose that platform owner has information on gender (man or woman) and online
behaviour (whether or not the buyer has searched for f2's product online).We assume
that ρ1 = 0.70 and that there are a equal number of men and women, and not searched
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and searched, with each subcategory (e.g. men who have searched for the product
online) making up 25% of the total proportion of buyers. We show the proportion of
type 1s in each subcategory in two markets,MA andMB, in the table below:
MA MB
Searched Not-searched Searched Not-searched
Man 0.9 0.9 0.75 0.8
Woman 0.3 0.7 0.55 0.7
The distribution of rms in the two markets is also depicted in the left-hand panel of
Figure 4.
By the denition of polarisation,MA is more polarised thanMB. Let HG represent
the hypergraph in which both rms are provided with data on the buyers' gender, HD
be the hypergraph where both rms are shown data on gender and on online behaviour
and H be generated by showing f1 no data and f2 data on both gender and on online
behaviour. In MA, the optimal hypergraph HG ∈ Λ∗A: both HD and H involve too
much revelation of type, and therefore do not yield as much prot as HG.
In MB, HD  HG: in this case, both HD, HG are dominance-preserving and HD
yields more prot than HG. This is an example of the result in Theorem 3. However,
note that H  HD: the platform owner prefers to provide less information to the popu-
lar rm in the less polarised market, as doing so allows them to show more information
to f2, inducing the latter to set a targeted price to women who have searched for f2's
product. In this case, f2 is being optimally provided with more detailed data than
before, though f1 is being provided with less. We depict this in the right-hand panel of
Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Left hand panel: the distribution of buyer types in MA (above) and MB
(below). Right hand panel: the asymmetrically informative hypergraph H.
Niche rms
In this section, we consider how the relative popularity of rms and the distribution of
that popularity aects the optimal revelation decisions of the platform owner. To do
so, we dene a measure of popularity which allows us to easily compare across markets:
Denition. fi is uniformally less popular in marketMA than marketMB i for any
Si, α(υ = i|sk,MB) = γα(υ = i|sk,MA) for all sk ∈ Si and γ ∈ (0, 1).
If fi is uniformly less popular in marketMA than in marketMB, then the proportion
of type is in every feasible segmentation of the data is smaller in MA than in MB.
We state the following condition that links the popularity of the niche rm and the
informativeness of the platform owner's optimal segmentation:
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Proposition 5. Suppose that f2 is uniformly less popular in MB than MA and that
HA ∈ Λ∗A and HB ∈ Λ∗B. If HA and HB are symmetrically informative and dominance-
preserving then HA is not more informative than HB under the type distribution in
MB.
If f2 is uniformly less popular in one market than another, then each edge containing f2
contains fewer type 2s by denition. The platform owner then has an incentive to reveal
more granular information about buyer preferences in order to present the rm with a
segment which contains a higher proportion of type 2s, with the aim of increasing f2's
ability to target buyers of their own type without reducing prices for other buyers to
too greater a degree.
Proposition 5 implies that rms selling more niche products in certain markets are
the rst-order beneciaries of the rise in big data techniques that allow the collection
of more granular consumer data. This nding tallies with a body of empirical research
that highlights the rise of niche products and product variety over the last one or two
decades (see, Neiman and Vavra, 2020) One explanation for such a rise is that it has
coincided with the popularity of both big data techniques and online markets more
generally, which have allowed the collection of more data on consumers and better
analysis of that data, which would be of particular benet to niche rms.
While there are competing explanations for the increasing viability of niche prod-
ucts (for example, the fact that online markets and consolidations in the retail sector
allow rms to serve a large audience than in the past), our account suggests that rms
operating in markets in which traditional demographic data is less useful as a means
of determining preferences benet more from this trend than other markets. Empirical
research examining the extent to which the rise of niche products diers between mar-
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kets would therefore be a useful way to analyse the use of data in dierent industries
hosted on online platforms.
7 Conclusion
Platforms collecting increasingly detailed data on consumer demographics and online
behaviour not only poses a threat to consumers when a rm is a monopoly. Such
data can be used selectively to increase the aggregate prots of rms on a platform by
providing rms with suciently informative data such that less popular rms increase
their price in segments of the population in which they are relatively popular, while at
the same time not being too informative such that rms drop their prices aggressively
in order to increase their sales in segments in which they are not popular.
The platform can further increase its prots by providing asymmetric data to the
rms, as doing so potentially induces the less popular rm to set a price which only
attracts buyers of its own type in a segment in which they are relatively popular, while
not allowing the other rm to set a relatively low price in that segment. As big data
collection techniques become more sophisticated, the potential for such asymmetric
segmentations to increase prots will necessarily increase as well.
However, the fact that providing too precise a signal of consumer type to both rms
is costly to the platform implies that how useful such big data will be depends on the
distribution of consumers within a given market. We nd that the platform has an
incentive to reveal more granular data in markets where consumer preference is less
polarised than in markets where broad demographic information is a relatively precise
signal of consumer type. In a market where the niche rm is particularly unpopular, the
platform is more likely to be able to reveal more precise information about consumer
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demographics and behaviour without creating too much competition than they are in
markets where the type distribution is more even.
Consumers concerned solely with the prices they observe would prefer for both rms
to be given complete information about their preferences. Platforms do not have an
incentive to perfectly inform rms, instead preferring to provide partial information
in order to decrease competition. A policy that constrains the platform's ability to
selectively reveal the information it holds will increase consumer surplus if that data is
suciently informative.
Of course, such a policy tool would not be cost-free in this context: the more in-
formation platforms provide to rms, the more there is potential for privacy concerns.
Policies, like GDPR, which are designed to defend consumer privacy on online platforms
may increase the ability of the platform to segment markets by centralising data collec-
tion, which results in rms operating on the platform having less information relative
to the platform itself, allowing the latter to release the data selectively in the manner
described here.
Appendix




, any equilibrium in the no-information hypergraph, it must be the case






Now, consider the equilibrium in the complete information hypergraph. In such






. It is clear that pck < p
∗
2 in
this case, and so pcj < p
∗
1. It follows immediately that for the set of prices observed
27
by any bi ∈ V1, are both lower in the complete information hypergraph than in the
no-information hypergraph.
It is possible (though by no means denite) that for bi ∈ V2 s2's price increases when
there is complete information compared to the no-information case; that is it might be
that p∗2 < p
c
j, and this in turn may increase prots on these buyers. However, as shown






1, which implies that an increase in prots from a type 2 rm
is outweighed by the decrease in prots from a type 1 rm. As ρ1 >
1
2
, it follows that
Hn > Hc.
Proof of Theorem 1
Let Ek, E
′
k ∈ HS , denote two edges in a symmetrically informative hypergraph gen-
erated by the same segment, sk ∈ S and where fi ∈ Ek and fj ∈ E
′
k. As S is an









ik is only a function of α(υ = 1|sk) in so far as a change in
α(υ = 2|sk) aects p∗jk′ which follows from the fact that the reaction function of f1 in






, which is not directly aected by the value of α(υ = 1|sk).

















As the pair of prices, p∗ik, p
∗
jk′
are not directly aected by the prices in any other edges





j ;αk). Given the above expressions for equilibrium prices and the prot func-
tion, πk(αk|sk) is convex in αk for αk ∈ (0, 12). Then πP (α|S) =
∑|S|
k πk(αk|sk) is convex
in α, a vector whose kth component is αk, when αk ∈ (0, 12), which holds here by the
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fact that S is dominance-preserving.
Now consider S ′ , which is also an informative, dominance-preserving segmentation
but less informative than S. It is well known (see Blackwell, 1953) that if a posterior
probability distribution, µ, is more informative in the Blackwell sense than another,
ϑ, with the same mean, then µ is a mean-preserving spread of ϑ. Hence, if S is more
informative than S ′ , then the distribution of type 2s it generates is a mean-preserving
spread of the equivalent distribution generated by S ′ . As πP (α|S) is convex, it follows
that πP (α|S) > πP (α|S
′
) and hence HS  HS′ .
Proof of Proposition 4
Let p
′
i denote the price vector of fi generated by H
′





hence the price set by fj in Et is equal for both hypergraphs. Consider the set of edges,
Φs, which are subsets of the targeted edge, Es ∈ H generated by taking the creation of
the renement of H, H
′
.
As per Proposition 1, H
′
is more informative than H, and hence ∃Ek ∈ Φs, which is








j by assumption, p
∗
ik, the equilibrium price
for Ek is equal to p
∗
is. This follows from the fact that, conditional on fi setting a price,
pis > pjt, the solution to the maximisation problem maxpisα(υ = i|Es)(1−χ(pis−pjt))pis
is independent of the conditional distribution generated by the segmentation chosen by
the platform owner. Hence, fi has no incentive to change its price unless fj changes
its price in this case. If every edge in Φk is targeted, then no rm has an incentive to









However, if there is an edge, Er ∈ Φs which is not targeted, then fi by denition
sets a price, p
′
ir in response to p
∗
j which is lower than p
∗
is. The existence of such an edge
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is possible given that H
′
is more informative than H. As prices are locally strategic
complements in this setting, this fall in prices would result in a reduction in pjt, further
reducing the prices set by fi in any edge, E ∈ Φs. Therefore, H  H
′
.
Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose that f1 receives no information and f2 is shown a segmentation, S, which is
such that there are two segments. One segment is such that α(v = 2|s1) = δ > ρ2 and
the other, s2, contains the remaining buyers.
Now, consider the value of δ, δ̂ < 1
2











21. To see such a














For a pair of edges generated by a segmentation si with α(v = 2|si) := αi, the symmetric















































it is immediately follows that δ̂ ∈ (0, 1
2





















and hence increases relative payo
Now, we show that there exists values of α1 where α1 ≥ δ̂ (and so f2 strictly prefers
to target s1) and p
′
1n ≥ pS21,which immediately implies that H  HS . In this setting,
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γ = ρ1 − |s1|+ ρ2. As |s1| = ρ2δ , ρ2 + γ = 1 + ρ2(1−
1
δ
). Let δ̃ ∈ (0, 1
2
) denote the value




21. Then the following expression holds:
3δ̃2 − δ̃(1− ρ2)− ρ2 = 0.
It follows that δ̃ = 1
6
[1 − ρ2 +
√















As the left hand-side of this inequality is increasing in δ̃, it follows that δ̃ > δ̂, and





Proof of Theorem 3
Let Ek, E
′
k ∈ HA, denote two edges in a symmetric hypergraph generated by the same
segment, sk ∈ SA and where f1 ∈ Ek and f2 ∈ E
′
k. As SA is dominance-preserving, it
follows that p∗1k > p
∗
2k′
for HA. Suppose that H is the hypergraph that is generated by
the same segmentation as HA inMB and hence is identical to HA under the conditions
inMA. Then, p∗1k > p∗2k′ for all edge pairs Ek, E
′
k ∈ H.
By the proof of Theorem 1, when p∗1k > p
∗
2k′
, p∗1k is only a function of α(υ = i|sk)
in so far as a change in α(υ = 2|sk) aects p∗jk′ . Given the functional form of the




are not directly aected by the prices in any other edges of H, it follows
that we can write πk(αjk|MA, sk) := πik(p∗i ,p∗j ;αjk) + πjk′ (p∗i ,p∗j ;αjk), where αjk =
α(υ = j|sk,MA) and πk(αjk|sk,MA) is a convex function. Then πP (α2|MA,SA) =∑|SA|
k πk(αjk|MA, sk) is convex in α2, a vector whose kth component is αjk.
If SA is more informative than S, then it is a mean-preserving spread of S. By the
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denition of informativeness, if SA is dominance-preserving, thenS
′
is also dominance-
preserving: if there was some segment, st, where α(υ = j|sk) > 12 , then it could not
be that SA is more informative than S
′
. As πP (α2|MA,SA) is convex in α2, it follows
that HA  H
′
, the hypergraph generated by the segmentation (S,S).
If SA and S are dominance-preserving under the conditions inMA, then the same
is true inMB, by the denition of polarisation. Similarly, the polarisation assumption
implies that SA is still a mean-preserving spread of S under the conditions inMB.
If HA and HB are symmetrically informative such that both rms are shown the
dominance preserving segmentations SA and SB respectively then it follows that SA
cannot be more informative than SB. If this were the case, then H would be strictly
preferred to HB for the marketMB, and hence HB /∈ Λ∗B.
Proof of Proposition 5
If SA is dominance-preserving in MA, it is also dominance-preserving in MB. This
follows because α(υ = 2|sk,MA) > α(υ = 2|sk,MB) and α(υ = 2|sk,MA) < 12 by
denition. Furthermore, if S less informative than SA then S is dominance-preserving
in both MA and MB. It follows from the proof of Theorems 1 and 3 that any HS
that is less informative than HA is dispreferred to HA under the conditions in bothMA
and MB. It follows immediately that HB cannot be less informative than HA if it is
dominance-preserving and symmetrically informative.
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